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 Despite its sudden rise, China has not engaged in balancing US power contrary to the 
prediction of the balance of power theory. The structure of a unipolar world restricts 
balancing which is effectively a revisionist act and disturbs the prevailing system whereas 
balancing is a status-quo behavior in a multipolar world because it has the effect of 
maintaining the current system. Additionally, the security dilemma generated by the 
challenger’s rise also hinders in balancing. The dominant power is not the only one 
concerned about its position, but the other great powers are also concerned about the 
impending change in the system. The challenger’s foreign policy is also encumbered by 
domestic factors like consensus among the elites and regime security. China is constrained by 
all these factors in both levels. Hence, the relative power of China does not explain all of its 
foreign policy behaviors.  
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 CHAPTER I 
       INTRODUCTION 
 In the last two decades, the field of international relations has been flooded with 
countless volumes of China study. Every possible theoretical viewpoint has been applied to 
discern the significance of China’s emergence as a great power. Unlike the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union, China’s arrival was long predicted and discussed in the works of 
international theorists. Nevertheless, the opacity of Chinese decision making process is 
troubling to western policy makers. China being a state ruled by one dominant political party, 
it is difficult to identify where the loyalty of the elites rests; in the State or in the Party. For 
any outside observer, the language is also a big hurdle unless he or she is proficient in 
Mandarian Chinese, the official government language. All these challenges are further 
exacerbated by the tight control of the regime on construction, dissemination and 
transmission of policy objectives. Decision making process is highly centralised in a handful 
of leaders and their objectives are channelled to the public through state controlled media 
outlets. It is no wonder that most of the studies are highly theoretical and concern structural 
parameters of international relations or domestic variables for the explanation of Chinese 
foreign policy behaviors. In other words, realists tend to look at China’s increasing power and 
its effects on the international balance of power to determine its foreign policy whereas most 
liberals use variables such as the nature of the regime and interdependence to come up with 
their conclusions. But, this kind of dichotomy in studying foreign policy is more likely to 
lead to faulty conclusions about Chinese intentions and conversely elicit mistaken responses 
from its foreign policy counterparts.  
 For these reasons, I focus on how Chinese elites formulate their foreign policy. I will 
look into how structural constraints posed by unipolarity, relative material capabilities and 
security dilemma affect their decision making. Then, I will cross-reference these structural 
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factors with two domestic factors–regime security, and elite consensus. My argument is that 
Chinese foreign policy makers are just as much encumbered by domestic factors as they are 
by structural factors. The logic behind this approach is that preferences and perceptions of 
elites matter and the calculation of political risks associated with certain foreign policy 
choices is significant in ascertaining Chinese behaviors. I also contend that China has not 
succumbed to a structural pressure to balance against US power. In outlining Chinese foreign 
policy, I align myself closely with neoclassical realist theory of foreign policy which includes 
recent works by scholars like Aaron Friedberg, Gideon Rose, Fareed Zakaria, Randall L. 
Schweller, Thomas J. Christensen and William C.Wohlforth. The next chapter presents a 
detailed discussion on neoclassical realism and the tools it provides to the students of 
















  CHAPTER II 
   LITERATURE REVIEW 
 In the aftermath of the Cold War, the field of international relations experienced some 
respite from often dogmatic and tiresome debates among realist, neorealist and neo-liberal 
camps. The unexpected fall of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolarity as a balancing 
mechanism in world politics cast serious doubts upon the structural explanations forwarded 
by neo-realists, and offered every one else an opportunity to reflect on their own approaches, 
as well. While neo-liberalism made some progress in the study of increasing 
institutionalization and interdependence, it simply did not present a complete picture of 
power politics among states and was associated more with an economic realm of the 
interstate relations–a charge refuted by die-hard institutionalists. Meanwhile, many 
disillusioned realists returned back to their roots and sought solace in the older texts of 
classical realism. An attempt was made to rejuvenate the field by revisiting the works of 
Thucydides, Weber, Carr, Clausewitz, Morgenthau, etc. 
 This revival was a noble idea in itself but these reformed realists have a big challenge 
at hand. They could not just abandon the body of scholarship that was created in last thirty 
years and embrace classical realism wholeheartedly. Granted, classical realism did have some 
shortcomings and limitations, which led to the development of the neorealist approach in the 
first place. The structuralist charge that classical realism lacked coherence due to its heavy 
dependence on human elements and the context of interstate relations was not completely 
baseless. Meanwhile, moving beyond this debate, there is an increasing number of works 
being done in the realist vein by scholars who are keenly aware of the shortcomings of both 
classical and neo variants of realism. This new theoretical strand, which was termed 
neoclassical realism by Gideon Rose (1998), seeks a synthesis of classical and structural 
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realisms. It starts with identifying systemic constraints on states’ behaviors but also takes into 
consideration the domestic variables in forging of states’ foreign policy behaviors.  
 The main precept of neoclassical realism is that the relative power of a state drives its 
foreign policies first and foremost (Rose 1998). But, the theory also contends that the relative 
power and material capabilities are not totally responsible for a state’s foreign policy 
behavior; the systemic variables instead take a circuitous route interacting with intervening 
variables at the unit level to come up with results. As an alternative to states’ characterization 
as security seeking units, neoclassical realists believe “that states respond to the uncertainties 
of international anarchy by seeking to control and shape their external environment” (Rose 
1998, 152). States are more likely to want more influence over their external environment. 
Neoclassical realists accept the definition of power as “the capabilities or resources, mainly 
military, with which states can influence one another” (Wohlforth 1993, 4). In accordance 
with such a definition, Zakaria posits that “increased resources give rise to greater ambitions. 
States are not resource-maximizers but influence-maximizers” (Zakaria 1998, 19). Therefore, 
neoclassical realism predicts that over the long term relative power of states will shape their 
ambitions: as their power capabilities increase, it is more likely that states will seek increased 
influence overseas and with decreasing relative power, the states are likely to curtail their 
ambitions. 
 At the second level, neoclassical realists argue that intervening variables such as 
decision makers’ perceptions, elite consensus, regime security and state structure are 
important for effective translation of systemic factors into states’ foreign policy decisions. As 
such, political elites are constrained by systemic as well as domestic variables. Hence, states 
are not conditioned by anarchy or systemic pressures only as neorealists would suggest. 
Anarchy, as Rose states, 
“…is neither Hobbesian nor benign but rather murky and difficult to read. States existing within it have 
a hard time seeing clearly whether security is plentiful or scarce and must grope their way forward in 
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twilight, interpreting partial and problematic evidence according to subjective rules of thumb” ( Rose 
1998, 152) 
  
 Neoclassical realism assumes the importance of relative power and expects it to affect 
states’ behavior. But, it refrains from assuming that states are actors conditioned to maintain 
their relative power in each and every instance. Unlike the premises of neorealism, which 
warrant a constant mobilization by a state against a rising threat, neoclassical realism 
provides for various responses ranging from hard balancing to underbalancing, depending 
upon the domestic political structure of the respective state. It recognizes the fact that foreign 
policy decisions are made by political leaders and elites with their own perceptions of the 
relative strengths of their rivals. Even when their prognosis is right about the threat posed by 
an enemy state, they are not always able to extract or direct enough resources to counter the 
threat. It is wildly unpopular to transfer a state’s limited resources to military programs unless 
the threat is clearly visible. Often, a threat is not so apparent. Therefore, states err by failing 
to respond to a legitimate challenger in a timely manner. Conversely, the threat is sometimes 
amplified by leaders, who are losing a grip on domestic politics, in order to consolidate 
power and root out their immediate opponents, leading to unnecessary foreign adventures.  
 Recognizing all these factors that can influence foreign policy decision making within 
a state, neoclassical realists have attempted to move beyond exclusive structural explanations 
of international relations. These realists maintain that scores of different variables and 
circumstances may affect foreign policy formulation one way or the other. However, they 
suggest that only the most important variables must be chosen in order to make theorizing 
foreign policy possible and less complicated. Among the variables most used by neoclassical 
realists are perception of elites, state-society relations, elite consensus, social cohesion, 
regime vulnerability and elite cohesion (Schweller 2004). 
 To all these classical realists, pursuit of power is what drives the locomotive of 
politics among nations (Morgenthau 1966 [1948]). Conflicts start when there is an imbalance 
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in power among the states but conflicts also start when there is a breakdown in community 
whether it’s a community of states or a community within a state. Anarchy or the lack of 
central authority differentiates international politics from domestic politics but “they see 
more variation in order and stability within domestic and international systems than they do 
between them” (Lebow 2003, 259).  
 To be sure, classical realists do not downplay the consequences of anarchy in the 
international order and the amount of constraints it places on politics itself. To them, anarchy 
is more of a general condition rather than a distinct structure (Waltz 1990, 36). Mearsheimer 
explains classical realist view as such, “… that structural constraint is treated as a second-
order cause of state behavior. The principal driving force in international politics is the will to 
power inherent in every state in the system, and it pushes them to strive for supremacy” 
(Mearsheimer 2002). All politics, whether local or international, is a struggle for power and 
subjected to same human drives, pathologies and hubris regardless of the levels where it is 
expressed.  
 Classical realists, therefore, do not make any distinction between domestic and 
international politics and regard the latter to be an extension of the former and “inseparable 
from social life itself”. Hence, it is no surprise that the pages of Thucydides’ account are full 
of instances where the dysfunction within Athens led to a dysfunctional foreign policy 
(Thucydides, Peloponnesian War 3.36-49.212-23[1972]). Lack of consensus, greed, 
miscalculation, pride and hubris led Athenian elites to send their troops to wage wars in the 
distant places leading to a disorder in the ancient city-states system. Thucydides regarded the 
rise of Athens and the fear among Spartans about this new development as the main cause of 
the conflict (Thucydides, Peloponnesian War 1.21-23.47-9 [1972]). But, he then went on to 
illustrate how unruly Athenian domestic politics led to the policy of overexpansion and 
finally the disintegration of the Empire. Athens prospered when it was united behind a 
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singular leader like Pericles, who defined his domestic and foreign policy objectives in terms 
of equality, justice and shared norms (Thucydides, Peloponnesian War 2.34-46.50-4 [1972]). 
Athens crumbled when consensus among the elites was broken at home and shared norms 
and community were destroyed because of its overtly imperial policies. 
 Balancing of power and the alliance system not only failed to prevent war in the 
ancient Greece but might have led to the war itself. The scuffle between Corcyra and Corinth, 
allies of Athens and Sparta respectively, led to the eventual confrontation between these 
patron states. Instead of acting as deterrence and a preventative structure, the balance of 
power mechanism proved conducive to the development of a systemic war. Thucydides was 
not alone in pointing out the ineffectiveness and inadequacy of the balance of power. 
Morgenthau credited relative stability in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
and the success of balance of power more to the strength of international society than to the 
distribution of capabilities (Morgenthau 1966 [1948]). The European community broke down 
only after Poland was partitioned for the first time through Napoleonic Wars which led to a 
failure of the balance of power system, not the other way around, i.e., the breakdown of 
balance of power leading to the systemic wars. 
 Unlike classical realism where human nature is the fundamental cause of wars, the 
root of international conflict in neorealism lies in the structure of the international system 
which is inherently anarchic. In the absence of a leviathan, states in an anarchic world are 
always in a constant struggle for power as a means for survival. While power becomes an end 
to the classical realists, to the structural realists, power is a means to achieve the ultimate 
motive of the state which is a maximum security. According to Waltz, states “cannot let 
power, a possibly useful means, become the end they pursue. The goal the system encourages 
them to seek is security” (Waltz 1979, 126). All states are rational actors that are functionally 
similar and the factor that can explain change in the system is the distribution of power 
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among the interacting units. Waltz described power in this manner: “Power in neorealist 
theory is simply the combined capability of state. Its distribution across states, and changes in 
that distribution, help to define structures and changes in them” (Waltz 1990, 36). States are 
always wary of the distribution of power in the system and if one state possesses 
disproportionate amount of power, then balancing tends to occur. Hence, the balance of 
power lies at the heart of neo-realism. 
  In making a contrast between Morgenthau and himself, Waltz stated that “for 
Morgenthau, balances are intended and must be sought by the statesman who produced them. 
For me, balances are produced whether or not intended” (Waltz 1997, 914). Balancing in 
neorealist understanding is a system induced behavior and a failure to do so against a 
challenger state would lead eventually to war and breakdown of international order. Waltz 
recently explained balancing behaviors of states as such: “As nature abhors a vacuum, so 
international politics abhors an unbalanced power” (Waltz 2000, 28) In similar vein, 
Mearsheimer contended that in an anarchic system where there is no central authority, status 
quo powers are rare and there is always an incentive for states to gain material advantage 
over its competitors (Mearsheimer, 2001, 21). Hence, states are constantly upgrading their 
material capabilities either to get material advantage or to balance against those who upgrade. 
In a self-help world, where states are motivated to tilt relative power in their favor, states 
failing to respond to a revisionist actor will be punished, lose influence, and may eventually 
succumb or degenerate. Therefore, for the maintenance of peace and stability, it is absolutely 
necessary for the balance of power to function in the neorealist conception of international 
politics.   
 No concept is as unclear as balancing in international relations study. It has been 
defined in numerous ways and lacks any concrete measure. Morgenthau had this to say about 
the concept: “the aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each trying either to 
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maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity to a configuration that is called the 
balance of power and to policies that aim at preserving it” (Morgenthau 1966, 163). Waltz 
only requires an anarchic international system and states’ will to survive for a balancing 
mechanism to appear. The imagery evoked by this definition is such that the balance of 
power mechanism resembles some gigantic clockwork–an inevitable natural process that 
keeps any unbalanced power in check by default. But, anomalies are too many in world 
politics to take the balance of power theorists at their words. The unwillingness among the 
other great powers to balance American hegemony is a current case where the balance of 
power theory proves weak. Going back to the earlier decades of the last century, Britain stood 
by while the United States surpassed it in combined capability. Recently, in a testing 
conducted by Wohlforth et al. (2007), the evidence contradicted the core balance of power 
hypothesis that balancing behavior prevents systemic hegemony. Surveying over 2000 years 
of international politics in the Middle East, the Mediterranean region, South and East Asia, 
and Central and South America, they found out that “sustained hegemonies routinely form, 
and balancing is relatively insignificant in explaining the emergence of nonhegemonic 
outcomes” (Wohlforth et al. 2007, 156). Similarly, in a study of early modern Europe, 
Victoria Tin-bor Hui found that the European balance of power was not a result of states’ 
penchant to balance against each other but was a result of relative weakness of state 
institutions, due to policies such as the sale of administrative offices and the dependence on 
loans for military expansion (Hui 2005). Therefore, no hegemon emerged with enough 
resources to disturb the balance of power. 
 It is unclear from Waltz’s works to determine the strength of his balance of power 
theory. At times, he suggests a strong balancing mechanism at work. Commenting on current 
international order, he contends that a movement from unipolarity to multipolarity is all but 
inevitable (Waltz 2000, 32). In another instance, he somewhat backtracks: “balancing among 
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states is not inevitable. As in Europe, a hegemonic power may suppress it” (Waltz 2000, 26). 
These statements give an appearance that Waltz’s balance of power theory as having mixed 
effects on the system, dependent upon the power distribution and the polarity of the system. It 
can be perceived as a continuum in which the left end is occupied by traditional hard 
balancing approach and the other end is occupied by bandwagoning approach (Waltz 1979, 
125-126).  
 The literature of international relations is filled with a litany of terms describing 
behaviors at odds with the claims of the traditional balance of power theory. Buck-passing, 
hedging, distancing, asymmetric balancing, omni-balancing, soft balancing, off-shore 
balancing, under-balancing and non-balancing are some of the tactics appraised in these 
works. For the sake of clarity and brevity, I will not evaluate each of those claims. However, 
it will be helpful to categorize some of the tactics so as to reveal the weakness of the balance 
of power in its neorealist version. Schweller has just done that for our convenience. 
 In an essay examining the phenomenon of under-balancing by states, Schweller (2004) 
explicates four distinct categories of state behaviors. The first, which he calls appropriate 
balancing, occurs against a revisionist state which cannot and should not be appeased. Next, 
overbalancing or inappropriate balancing takes place when a defensive minded power is 
misperceived as an aggressor resulting in needless and costly arms race spiral. The third 
category, which he calls nonbalancing, consists of a range of tactics including buck-passing, 
bandwagoning, appeasement, engagement, distancing, or hiding. Lastly, so called 
underbalancing occurs due to the unwillingness of states to balance or to do so efficiently 
against a dangerous and unappeasable state. This categorization extends both sides of Waltz’s 
continuum previously discussed. At the left end, the strategy of overbalancing stretches the 
continuum, whereas at the right end, the strategy of underbalancing stretches the continuum 
further right. Waltz only restricts states between traditional balancing and bandwagoning and 
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whatever comes in between. Schweller’s continuum provides for a variety of states’ strategies 
and a better overall depiction of states’ behavior.  
 For the purpose of this thesis, I adapt Schweller’s definition of balancing. Schweller 
defines balancing as such,  
  “Balancing means the creation or aggregation of military power through internal mobilization 
  or the forging of alliances to prevent or deter the territorial occupation or political and  
  military  domination of the state by a foreign power or coalition. Balancing exists only  
  when the stakes concern some form of political subjugation or, more directly, the  
  seizure of territory, either one's homeland or vital interests abroad (e.g., sea-lanes, allies,  
  colonies, etc.). Thus, balancing requires that states target their military hardware at each other 
  in preparation for a potential war. If two states are merely building arms for the purpose of 
  independent action against third parties, they are not balancing” (Schweller 2004, 166). 
 
 This definition of balancing has two components, i.e. internal balancing via an 
increase in a state’s material capabilities by internal development, and an external component 
which takes places by forming an alliance with like-minded states against a dominating 
power. Both of these actions increase a state’s relative capability compared to that of a 
hegemon. 
 Concerning China’s reaction to US unipolarity and hegemony, the appraisals among 
scholars are varied. Most liberals see China as being pulled closer to mainstream of 
international politics via interdependence, institutionalization and an increasing level of 
democratization internally. This group of scholars argues that the liberal politics of US led 
international order will accommodate China’s rise successfully. Given that China is 
benefiting from stability and security provided under US hegemony, China will remain a 
satisfied power with little qualms about prevailing international arrangements. Besides, China 
has significant domestic challenges which will keep it away from foreign adventures. Taylor 
M. Fravel (2008) suggests that the main issues of concern for Chinese elites are internal 
stability and regime security. He further maintains that China does have limited territorial 
aims in Taiwan and the South China Sea; however, these aims are not necessarily 
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expansionist from the Chinese perspective. Unless Taiwan unexpectedly declares 
independence, China will not diverge from its current policy of gradual reconciliation.  
 Conversely, other scholars, mostly realists, assume that a rising China will eventually 
seek a status reflecting its material capabilities. China has not completely succumbed to the 
structural pressure to balance the US. The reasons behind this approach according to Yong 
Deng are the prevalence of bandwagoning by other powers, domestic insecurity, and 
“perceived high costs of open confrontation with the United States combine to explain 
Beijing’s hesitancy” (Deng 2001, 344). But, it should not surprise any one if China changes 
its attitude drastically as it approaches power-parity. Given its increasing economic and 
military strength, Mearsheimer believes that, “China, like all previous potential hegemons, 
[will] be strongly inclined to become a real hegemon” (Mearsheimer 2001, 400). Thomas J. 
Christensen (2001) sees a real potential of Sino-American conflict over Taiwan given the 
saliency of the matter in Chinese domestic politics and China’s overestimation of its 
asymmetric warfare capabilities and its underestimation of American resolve on that 
particular issue. As does Fravel, Christensen sees a possibility of Taiwan issue creating 
legitimacy problem at home for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime and it may lead 
a weaker China to attack Taiwan and its protector, the United States. Christopher Layne, on 
the other hand, holds that the days of the American unipolar moment are numbered and 
suggests that China has already started to balance against US hegemony (Layne 2006, 36-37). 
But, Layne also acknowledges the difficulty of balancing in a unipolar world and holds that 
the Waltzian prediction on balancing has yet to come to fruition–an argument similar to one 
made by Pu and Schweller (2011). 
 While most realist observers of international relations recognize that China’s foreign 
policy will be influenced by its growing relative power and that it will seek some revision in 
the system, there are increasing numbers of scholars who think that China’s rise will not 
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bring conflicts and a complete change in the system (Goldstein 2001; Shambaugh 2004). 
Instead of seeking revision substantially, China is more likely to be a conservative power 
with limited ambitions rather than a revolutionary state (Johnston 2003).  
 On the other hand, scholars of Chinese political psychology and nationalism consider 
the approach of devising a state’s foreign policy from the vantage of relative power a 
mistaken one. Hence, Peter Hays Gries writes, “Intentions should not be inferred from power 
alone, whether relative or asymmetric. The actions of other states and a variety of emotions 
(pride, anger, etc.) also influence decisionmakers” (Gries 2001, 155). 
METHODOLOGY 
 Given the theoretical stance of neoclassical realism that relative power does not 
directly and efficiently translate into a state’s foreign policy behavior, it is inadvisable to 
expect clear cut models out of neoclassical realists’ works. At the same time, these theorists 
also tend to avoid “thick description” of a state’s domestic politics to avoid pitfalls associated 
with countless variables. Their works are more likely to be case studies and theoretically 
informed narratives. Despite the movement towards formal and universalistic approaches in 
political science, neoclassical realists are still in favor of area studies since the explanation of 
unit level variables’ effects on foreign policy requires significant knowledge of domestic 
political structures. Therefore, a neoclassical realist analysis starts with the descriptions of 
systemic pressures and the role of relative power in states’ behaviors. Then, such an analysis 
will look for any domestic constraints that might impede effective translation of a state’s 
relative power into its foreign policy. The analyst may come up with a range of actions or 
hypotheses as to how the state is likely to behave.     
 Accordingly, I will first look into the structural and systemic constraints imposed on 
Chinese foreign policy making, especially the effects of US unipolarity and the security 
dilemma caused by China’s increasing power. In the second level of analysis, I will examine 
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which domestic variables contribute to China’s decision making process. Finally, I will 
conduct a case study of Chinese currency policy to see how these international and domestic 
factors affect the decision making process.   
 
       





















          CHAPTER III 
         UNIPOLARITY AND SECURITY DILEMMA  
 The structure of world politics in the post Cold War period is defined by unipolarity. 
Due to its vast superiority in military capabilities and its status as the biggest economy, the 
US occupies a hegemonic position. Never before in history has any one state been so 
dominant in world affairs. America’s military virtually dominates every ocean and controls 
every corner of the globe. It can stage intervention in any locale around the globe within a 
reasonable timeframe. The US military alone spends about 43% of the world’s total military 
expenditure (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2011; hereafter SIPRI).  
 Given this concentration of power in one actor, the traditional balance of power 
theory which predicts a balancing coalition of weaker states against the most dominant one 
seemingly falters. Such balancing behavior is a more viable option in bi-polar and multi-polar 
worlds where the prospect of being singled out and punished by the dominant power is less 
than in a unipolar world. The act of balancing is a status quo policy in a multi-polar world 
because it intends to maintain the power distribution in the system, whereas in a unipolar 
world, balancing is effectively a revisionist policy because it has an effect of changing the 
power distribution (Schweller  2008; Pu and Schweller 2011). Moreover, the hegemon is 
likely to react harshly to such revisionist acts. Therefore, Layne suggests that “in a unipolar 
world, states must adapt to U.S. hegemony by finding balancing strategies that avoid direct 
military confrontation with the hegemon” (Layne 2006, 29). Hence, a challenger state has to 
be surreptitious in its response to hegemony; hide its intentions, downplay its rising strength, 
ignore and often bandwagon with the dominant power contrary to the prediction of the 
balance of power theory. Even when the challenger has sufficient resources to balance against 
the leading state, it is not automatic that the challenger will expend its resources on waging 
war to end the streak of dominance.  
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 In the post Cold War era, Chinese leaders envisioned a multi-polar world (Zemin 
2010, 270). They assumed that the US would remain the most powerful among great powers 
but they also believed multilateralism would be the next trend in world politics. It didn’t take 
too long for them to realize that their prognostication was inaccurate. As interdependence was 
increasing with newer trade relations and institutionalization, the structure of international 
system indisputably favored American power and its continuation. Most international 
organizations and multilateral venues like the United Nations (UN) and the Bretton Woods 
System were effectively controlled by the US and its allies. The US-backed North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization survived the end of Soviet Union and has remained as the strongest 
alliance in the post Cold War era. The liberal wave of democratization and globalization that 
has swept the third World has further enhanced American power (Nye 1990).  
 Under these circumstances, China’s choices were constricted. Though it had split 
from the Communist bloc earlier and became an avowed member of the non-aligned 
movement, it was now dangerous to stand alone while most of the great powers were 
reluctant to confront the United States. Given that China had just come out battered and 
bruised by the domestic upheaval highlighted by the Tiananmen Square Massacre, it was 
risky to confront a hegemon equipped with superior power and a strong alliance. So, it was 
only consequential that China opted to form a limited partnership with the reigning hegemon 
until it developed sufficient power capabilities to deter attacks against it. Jiang Zemin, thus 
recognized the importance of the relationship with the US in a 1993 speech to Chinese 
diplomatic envoys, 
  “It is still the leader of the Western World, and Japan and Western Europe are still not its  
  equal. Whether we can maintain stable relations with the United States has far reaching  
  implications. The United States is still our primary export market and important   
  source of capital, technology and advanced managerial expertise. Preserving and developing 
  our relations with the United States is therefore strategically important for China” (Zemin     
  2010, 302).  
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 This was the logic behind China’s pursuit of ‘most favored nation’ (MFN) status and 
its close partnership with the United States in the early 1990s. A stable relationship with the 
US not only had security implications but also economic consequences vital for China’s 
development. On the other hand, the US had its own reasons for conferring such status on 
China. It hoped to benefit by opening the huge Chinese market to its multinational 
corporations while also pulling China away from its autocratic rule into the mainstream of the 
world politics.  
 In sum, the main goal of Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War was to promote an 
external environment conducive to its internal economic growth that was necessary for it to 
rise to great power status. Jiang made this clear to his diplomats in the same speech, when he 
stated, 
  “The fundamental objective of our diplomatic work is to further consolidate and  develop a 
  peaceful international environment – especially a neighboring environment – beneficial to 
  China in order to serve its reform, opening up and economic development, as well as the great 
  cause of reunifying the motherland” (Zemin 2010, 305). 
  
 Fully aware that its rise was dependent upon peace and stability in the international 
world, China set out to establish diplomatic linkages with other nations. At the same time, it 
also had to make sure that no other nations, especially the United States, formed an alliance 
against it. As the Chinese economy posted strong growth rates in the early 1990s and internal 
strife subsided, the party leaders grew more confident in their efforts to modernize China, 
even as China’s sudden rise was also arousing suspicion among its neighbors and the United 
States. China’s assertive and forceful stances against Taiwan during the Strait Crisis and in 
the South China Sea territorial disputes only reinforced its image as an unsatisfied power 
seeking to change the status quo (Goldstein 1997, 69). Chinese leaders became increasingly 
worried about the growing perception of the “China threat” among foreigners while also 
being circled by states suspicious of its intentions and rising power (Gertz 2000). For instance, 
in a Foreign Affairs article, Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro cautioned that “driven by 
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nationalist sentiment, a yearning to redeem the humiliations of the past, and the simple urge 
for international power, China is seeking to replace the United States as the dominant power 
in Asia” (Bernstein and Munro 1997, 19). Therefore, Chinese leaders had to come up with 
some ways to check the perception of threat emanating from China’s newfound capabilities. 
The New Security Concept–A Grand Strategy?  
 The Party leaders came out with the New Security Concept (NSC) in 1996. It called 
for a solution of regional problems according to principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, 
equality and coordination (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001a; hereafter MFA). It was not 
much different from “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” which China presented as its 
foreign policy doctrine in 1954. This new code of conduct reiterated China’s commitment to 
its long held beliefs of equality in negotiations, non-intervention in internal affairs and 
peaceful solutions to international problems. The concept sought to curb security concerns 
among states through diplomatic means and by increasing economic interdependence. 
Diplomacy and cooperation could take a variety of forms under such a concept, from strong 
and binding multi-lateral security mechanism to “a forum-like multi-lateral security dialogue” 
(MFA 2001a). Additionally, states could engage in “confidence-building bilateral security 
dialogue” (MFA 2001a) or engage in unofficial dialogues of academic nature.  
 The framework of the NSC provided China with flexible means to promote its 
security concerns in the region. First and foremost, by promoting a policy of non-intervention 
in internal affairs, China could ask other nations to stay out of issues like Taiwan and Tibet. 
As far as China is concerned, these issues are essentially Chinese domestic issues and the 
solutions to these problems should be addressed not in international forums but by the 
Chinese themselves. Second, by advocating equality in negotiations and forums, China could 
project a fair and a less threatening picture of its foreign policy and effectively negate the 
increasing security dilemma in the region (Shambaugh 2004). Third, the framework of the 
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concept also provided bilateral confidence building measures allowing China to resolve 
issues in bilateral settings where China could extract concessions from the other party (Kuik 
2005). Fourth, by taking initiatives to incorporate regional issues in forums like the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China mitigated the possibility of unilateral 
actions by a single influential actor, including the United States (Foley 2005, 2). Fifth, the 
unofficial channels of dialogue provided China with a medium to exchange foreign policy 
concerns with others without subjecting it to any binding mechanism or expectations borne 
out of official diplomacy (Odgaard 2003, 22-23). 
Multilateralism to Check Security Dilemma and Security Concerns 
 Even though China had envisioned a multipolar world with increased 
institutionalization, China primarily shunned multilateral diplomacy in favor of bilateral ties 
in its foreign policy endeavours in the early part of the decade (Kuik 2005). It preferred the 
less constraining effects of bilateral diplomacy to the complications of multilateralism, 
especially when it could pressure less powerful states in extracting more favorable foreign 
policy outcomes. But, its experience in the South China Sea offered a different conclusion. It 
found that states in South East Asia united when addressing the prospects of coexistence 
(Odgaard 2003, 11). For instance, in 1993 ASEAN recommended the presence of US forces 
in the region to potentially keep Chinese aggression in check (Odgaard 2003, 20). The rise of 
China and its activities in the South China Sea had indeed threatened these ASEAN members. 
 Hence, China decided to implement multilateralism in its foreign policy in a 
pragmatic way. It sought to shape the architecture of these regional forums by participating in 
them. A 1995 report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of Asia Pacific 
Studies recommended that “China should proactively shape the development of the 
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mechanism from within, in order to ensure a favourable position in a fluid and complex 
security environment” (Kuik 2005, 106).  
  China also found out that it could change its threat-perception and quell suspicions 
about its rising power by actively participating in regional forums and promoting cooperation 
and a common approach. This development was observed by David Shambaugh in an 
International Security essay,  
  “As a result, most nations in the region now see China as a good neighbor, a constructive  
  partner, a careful listener, and a non threatening regional power. This regional perspective is 
  striking, given that just a few years ago, many of China’s neighbors voiced growing concerns 
  about the possibility of China becoming a domineering regional hegemon and powerful  
  military threat. Today these views are muted” (Shambaugh 2004, 64). 
  
 Furthermore, China’s participation in multilateral institutions also provided forums 
from where it could speak against unabated unilateralism and hegemony. Multilateralism, as 
such, provided China with an effective means to suppress the security dilemma created by its 
emergence, as well as a hedge against continued US dominance in the region. By 
incorporating multilateralism in its foreign policy, China did not abandon bilateralism, 
however. In fact, between 1999 and 2000, it signed bilateral political agreements with all 
ASEAN states (Kuik 2005, 114). Thus, both of these diplomatic tracts became 
complementary elements of Chinese foreign policy. 
ASEAN IS NO ALLIANCE FOR CHINA 
 China has been very active in the South East Asia to promote its foreign policy 
objectives since the evolution of the New Security Concept. China did maintain a dialogue 
with ASEAN before it became in 1997 an official member of ASEAN Plus Three (APT), 
which is basically a grouping of ASEAN along with China, Japan and South Korea. China 
attended the opening session of the 24
th
 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in July 1991 
held in Kuala Lumpur as a guest of Malaysia. It was extended full Dialogue Partner status at 
the 29
th
 AMM held in Indonesia on July 1996. ASEAN and APT, as regional forums are 
mainly concerned with issues such as trade, development, technology, agriculture, culture, 
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environment, terrorism and trans-national crimes. ASEAN does have a dialogue and 
consultation mechanism for common political and security matters in the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) in which China has participated since its founding in 1994. However, even 
ARF is toothless as compared to NATO and mainly serves as a forum for confidence-
building and preventative diplomacy. Recently, APT has extended coordination to another 
pan-Asian forum, the East Asia Summit (EAS) which includes APT members, Australia, 
India, New Zealand, Russia and the United States. 
 Despite China’s involvement in the APT and ARF processes, the Sino-ASEAN 
relationship is mostly an economic one. The prospect of a strong security alliance is very 
remote. Many ASEAN members have conflicting maritime claims with China in the South 
China Sea. Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam all have maritime disputes with 
China over the Spratlys, whereas Vietnam and China both claim the jurisdiction over the 
Paracel Islands and even engaged in a conflict in 1974. China, the Philippines and Vietnam 
also claim the rights over the Mischief Reef, where China has been building structures since 
1994 on the features once controlled by the Philippines. China and ASEAN members signed 
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002 which provides for 
peaceful solution of the disputes. However, the disputes are far from being resolved and the 
concerns among ASEAN members are growing because of China’s growing economic and 
military clout. The Chinese government changed its tone in 2010 when it declared the South 
China Sea a “core national interest”–a characterization previously associated with Tibet and 
Taiwan issues, where China has stated that it is willing to use military force (Weitz 2011, 8). 
 Therefore, to hedge against a Chinese military build-up in the South China Sea, 
ASEAN countries have significantly increased their arm-imports. According to a SIPRI 
Report 2010, arm imports to South East Asia nearly doubled in 2005–2009 period compared 
to 2000–2004. Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia reported growth in arm imports of 722 %, 
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146% and 84% in 2005–2009 compared to 2000–2004, respectively (SIPRI 2010a). 
Additionally, the countries in the region have sought to develop security relations with the 
US. For instance, Vietnam, which has historical animosities with China in both land and sea, 
is on the lookout for a better relationship with the US. In March 2010, it signed a 
memorandum of understanding with the US to participate and cooperate in peaceful 
development of nuclear technology to serve its growing energy demand. In October 2010, 
Vietnam invited the US to use the naval base at Cam Ranh Bay for peaceful purpose (Weitz 
2011, 12). The Philippines and Singapore also allow the US to use its naval bases and confer 
visiting rights for its aircraft carriers as agreed upon in the US-Philippines Visiting Forces 
Agreement of 1999 and the Addendum to the 1990 US-Singaporean Memorandum of 
Understanding respectively (Tow 2004, 440-444). 
 As evident, there is a huge amount of distrust among ASEAN nations and China 
despite the deepening of economic interdependence. In fact, ASEAN nations seem to be 
hedging China and the US against each other. This allows them to keep both powers in check, 
and minimize their influence in regional matters.   
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization-A New NATO? 
 In line with the NSC, China played an instrumental role in the creation of the SCO in 
2001 with the Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Russia. The process started with the original “Shanghai Five” in 1996, which included all the 
states of the SCO except Uzbekistan, which formally joined the organization in 2001. The 
charter goal of the organization is to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism in Central 
Asia. The SCO has signed four major agreements since its founding: the Agreement on 
Confidence Building Measures in Military Field along the Border Areas, the Agreement on 
Mutual Reduction of Military Forces along the Border Areas, the Shanghai Convention on 
Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism and the Agreement on Regional Counter-
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terrorism Agency. The SCO and its regimes have proved beneficial in coordinating actions 
against terrorists and separatists in the Far West where China has seen a rise in separatist 
sentiments in recent years. By engendering cooperation and relations with these resource-rich 
Central Asian nations, China is in essence trying to secure its future energy needs. Also, the 
agreement to reduce the military presence along mutual borders also is significant because 
decreased military presence will allay security concerns and the prospects of conflicts 
between the participants. It will also allow the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to move its 
ground forces toward more populous parts of the country in the East and the South. 
 Despite the increasing cooperation in the SCO, there is no evidence that the 
organization is moving towards a defence organization similar to NATO. There are a number 
of issues that hinder an alliance formation between China, Russia, and the four Central Asian 
states. First, the four Central Asian states are more troubled by Chinese and Russian influence 
than by any Western powers (Horta 2008). The suspicion of Russia is easily understood due 
to the imperial history of the Soviet Union in the region. While China is seen in a positive 
light because it never occupied the region, its increasing economic influence in Central Asia 
is leading to fears that China prefers to restore the Sino-centric tributary system (Horta 2008, 
32). This fear is reinforced by the fact that China claimed historical rights over one third of 
Tajik territories up until 2002. Additionally, these Central Asian states are mostly dependent 
on foreign aid, especially from the European Union and the United States. Investments from 
American energy companies, which are seen as more reliable, are also welcomed by the 
leaders in these nations. 
 Second, Russia is increasingly uneasy about the increased Chinese presence in Central 
Asia. At the moment, a short term strategy may favor partnership with China to limit 
American influence in the region. However, China may present a bigger challenge in the long 
run in the region which Russia considers within its sphere of influence (Horta 2008, 30). This 
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mutual suspicion among China and Russia will hinder in the transformation of the SCO into 
an organization similar to NATO. It is likely to remain an organization focused on preventing 
terrorism and separatism as well as fostering economic exchanges. The fact that the SCO 
refused to endorse Moscow’s actions in Georgia in 2008 and that it still does not recognize 
the Russian backed territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia confirms the non-military 
nature of the SCO (Blank 2008, 39). 
Sino-Russian Relation-What Hinders an Alliance? 
 The alliance that makes the most sense if it were to form against the US is a Sino-
Russian alliance. Despite the common interest in diminishing US dominance, these two 
countries have not made a decision to foster a serious partnership. Both China and Russia 
attempted to normalize their relations in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
This started with an official visit by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in December, 1992, 
when he and the Chinese President Yang Shang Kun signed a Joint Statement on the 
Foundation of Mutual Relations. They pledged to “establish good-neighbourly, friendly and 
mutually beneficial relations” and Chinese and Russian officials signed “24 other statements, 
documents and memoranda of understanding on cooperation on a range of issues, 
including border demarcation and reductions in armed forces” (Kile 1999, 500). Soon 
afterwards, in a reciprocal visit by the Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Moscow in 
September 1994, a joint statement released with Yeltsin defined Sino-Russian relationship as 
a “constructive partnership.” The visit also resulted in both countries pledging not to initiate 
the use of nuclear weapons and target their missiles across their borders.    
 The Sino-Russian union was strengthened further by the Treaty of Good-
Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, a twenty-year strategic, economic, and 
geopolitical treaty, signed in 2001 by Jiang Zemin and Vladimir Putin. Article IX of the 
treaty is particularly controversial because some analysts regard it as a defence pact (Cohen 
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2001; Menges 2001). The article stated that “When a situation arises in which one of the 
contracting parties deems that peace is being threatened and undermined or its security 
interests are involved or when it is confronted with the threat of aggression, the contracting 
parties shall immediately hold contacts and consultations in order to eliminate such threats” 
(MFA 2001b). It is not clear yet if China and Russia are in fact moving towards an old-
fashioned alliance. This alliance would provide huge benefits to both parties. For China, 
Russia is a great source of arms, weapons and technology, and for Russia, China provides a 
huge market for its natural resources. The potential for energy exports to China is real with 
some Chinese experts predicting that Russia will be able to provide 25 -30 billion cubic 
meters of natural gas, 15-18 billion kilowatts of electricity from Siberia and 25-30 million 
tons of oil from the Kovykta oil field in Eastern Siberia (Menges 2001).  
 Recently, in November of 2010, China and Russia signed an agreement to allow for 
the use of their own currencies in trades between them, instead of the dollar. This move, 
probably a move to improve bilateral trade also undermines the dollar’s position as a de facto 
currency in international transactions. While the prospects for Sino-Russian relationship seem 
superficially good, there are many reasons that could derail the process. First and foremost, 
the historical memory of the Sino-Soviet split at the height of the Cold War has not totally 
been erased. More importantly, China and Russia will themselves vie for influence in Central 
Asia and Northeast Asia. As China grows stronger and wealthier, Russia is likely to get 
nervous about its role in Central Asia as well as in the overall Eurasian region. Historically, 
Russia held the status of the most dominant power in the region–a place China is likely to 
take away from Russia but which it will prefer to maintain. Also, the fact that China and 
Russia are geographically conjoined and share thousands of miles of border will play a 
greater role in heightening rivalry between them. Already, Russia is worried about increasing 
Chinese influence in the Far East, the evidence of which is recent high profile visits to the 
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region by Russian leaders (Kaplan 2009). Given these circumstances, the dawning of a strong 
Sino-Russian alliance is not inevitable. It is unlikely unless the United States chooses to 
become a belligerent power in the region, leaving them no choice but to embrace each other 
in opposing US hegemony. 
Economic Dependency on Hegemon  
 Apart from security issues, China is also hugely dependent on the US to maintain its 
economic growth. Even though it is rapidly developing, it will take few decades before China 
reaches economic parity with the United States. There are numerous predictions including the 
US Government’s National Intelligence Council projection of impending economic parity 
between China and the United States. According to a National Intelligence Council (NIC) 
2004 report, China will match the US GDP around 2040 (NIC 2004, 32). A 2008 economic 
paper presented by Goldman Sachs predicts that economic parity is more likely to occur 
around 2027, revising its previous estimate of 2040 which was adopted by NIC 2004 report 
(Purushothaman and Wilson 2003; O’Neill and Stupnytska 2009). No matter where the 
estimates go, it is clear from trends in manufacturing and trade that the Chinese economy 
occupies a central role in the world economy. China became the lead manufacturing state in 
2010 with 19.8 percent of total global output as compared to 19.4 for the United States; 
effectively ending the US’s 110 year run (Marsh 2011). Contrary to China’s perception as a 
low cost manufacturing center of apparel, cheap electronic products and household items, a 
look at export data shows a different picture. For instance, in 2009, China export figure for 
high-technology products was $348 billion compared to $141.5 billion for the United States 
(See Table 1).  
 Despite all these significant economic gains, Chinese leaders are still mindful of 
China’s huge dependency on exports to the United States and on foreign trade overall. 
Diversification is highly needed if China wants to escape unscathed from global financial 
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turmoil in the future. Its GDP is very reliant on exports and this fact should be unsettling for 
Chinese leaders because consumption in Western economies is slowing down due to recent 
recessionary pressures.  
     Table 1: High Tech Exports for Selected Countries (1990- 2009), Current US $.  
Country Name 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
China  N/A 13.1 40.8 214.2 348.2 
Germany 39.2 57.1 82.7 142.5 142.4 
Japan 65.6 110.1 127.3 122.6 99.2 
United Kingdom 34.5 52.1 69.9 82.8 57.1 
United States 90.9 128.7 196.6 190.8 141.5 
      Source: World Bank Database (Accessed on November 5, 2011). 
 As of 2010, the total trade between these two countries amounted to $459 billion and 
the US remains China’s biggest trading partner (US Congress 2011b, 1). But, this 
dependency has also become worrisome to the Chinese leaders lately. Due to the credit 
crunch experienced after the bursting of the housing bubble in US market and the impending 
cost cutting in public sectors forced by large budget deficits, it is likely the consumption in 
the US will stagnate for the foreseeable future. Simultaneously, the voices for actions against 
an alleged Yuan undervaluation are getting louder in the United States, which might possibly 
lead to countermeasures including introduction of tariffs against Chinese products. These 
developments do not bode well for Chinese exports and in the event any one of these 
scenarios is materialized, the Chinese unemployment level will go up resulting in social 
unrest. 
 China has also looked to increase its trade with ASEAN economies. Its trade with 
ASEAN economies increased from  $39.5 billion in 2000 to $178.2 billion in 2009 (See 
Table 3). Similarly, it has pushed for increased trade relations with Australia, Brazil, India 
and Russia.  Most analysts concur that its recent diplomatic and trade promotion in Africa is 
the result of its policy to diversify its trading partners (African Development Bank 2011). 
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Resource rich Africa will provide China’s industries with raw materials in the future as well 
as a future market for China’s huge manufacturing output.  
 In a concerted effort to find consumers for its huge industrial outputs, China has also 
attempted to increase consumption at home. At the moment, China’s internal consumption 
only accounts for 36% of its GDP, which compared to the United States (over 70%) is very 
low (Woetzel et al., 2009). With increasing wealth, China’s middle class is likely to increase 
its consumption. The main structural impediment to low consumption in China is its lack of 
social safety nets and welfare programs similar to Western welfare programs. Regardless, 
internal consumption is only going to move up which should give a boost to China’s 
economy and make it less reliant on foreign trade. The huge economic stimulus the 
government introduced in 2008 in the wake of the housing crisis had very positive effects on 
its economy (WB 2009). Sitting atop a cash reserve of $3 trillion, China could very well use 
its cash reserve to stimulate its economy in the event of future crisis. 
     Table 2: China's Top Trade Partners, 2010 (in US $ billions) 
Rank Country/region      Volume % change over 2009 
1 United States        385.3 29.2 
2 Japan        297.8 30.2 
3 Hong Kong        230.6 31.8 
4 South Korea        207.2 32.6 
5 Taiwan        145.4 36.9 
6 Germany        142.4 34.8 
7 Australia         88.1 46.5 
8 Malaysia         74.2 42.8 
9 Brazil         62.5 47.5 
10 India         61.8 42.4 
           Source: PRC General Administration of Customs, China's Customs Statistics 
 
     Table 3: ASEAN-China Total Trade, 2000-2003 (in US $ billions) 
 
             Year 2000       2009 
             Total Trade 39.5       178.2 





 All realists agree that relative power is the single most important factor in explaining 
a state’s behavior in the international arena. From there on, there is not much concurrence 
among realists as to how and when the emergent power will manifest its newly acquired 
power. The balance of power theory predicts that the rising power will challenge the most 
dominant power in the international system either by forming a balancing alliance or by 
acquiring comparable material capabilities (internal vs. external balancing). Neorealists 
suggest that such policies of states are induced by the structure of an anarchic international 
system, where states take it upon themselves the task of correcting system-wide imbalance in 
power in order to ensure their survival. Therefore, China as a rising power is equally 
concerned by American dominance and seeks to restore the balance of power. 
 However, Chinese foreign policy behaviors in the post Cold War period do not show 
any significant evidence of an alliance formation against the United States. In fact, China and 
its leaders have utilized the relative peace and stability provided by American hegemony to 
bolster its relative power in order to acquire a greater power status in the international system. 
This alliance formation has been hindered first because of sheer American dominance in the 
current world. Second, instead of aligning with other powers to alleviate American 
dominance as neorealism predicts, ironically China had to work to lessen the security 
dilemma generated by its own rise among the same nations with which it could possibly form 
an alliance against the United States. Neorealism does not account for this pattern of 
interstate relations. It only focuses on power rivalry between the first rate power and whoever 
the next challenger is. The security dilemma among Northeast Asian actors itself has impeded 
the creation of traditional alliance directed against the United States. Historical rivalries, 
memories of subordination and mutual distrust are great barriers to the formation of Sino-
Russian or Sino-ASEAN alliances. Even the geography of Northeast Asia is a hindrance to 
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such alliances. China still has many unresolved territorial and maritime disputes with its 
possible partners. Even if these claims are settled, nations are still worried about China’s 
increasing influence inside their borders. Russia, for similar reasons, has all of a sudden 
started to consolidate its power in its Far East region fearful of China’s influence due to 
increased migration in sparsely populated Russian territories. ASEAN nations have similar 
concerns with China’s increasing influence in their respective economies and the security 
implications. 
 However, the lack of alliance formation or traditional hard balancing does not mean 
that China has no aspirations in replacing the position held by the US in the world order. At a 
minimum, it seeks a multi-polar world. The structural constraints have compelled China to 
devise other ways. First and foremost, China has focused internally to enhance its relative 
power and has already succeeded in closing the power gap. Second, China has also 
undertaken what can be viewed as an undermining of the US’s global authority via its 
newfound partnerships and linkages, and its call for multilateralism and its activism in global 
forums.  
 Modelski (1987) predicted that a rising power involved in delegitimation of a 
hegemon’s power will simultaneously build up its arms and will seek allies to eventually 
fight a hegemonic war for renewal of the system. Similarly, other hegemonic stability 
theories (Gilpin’s (1981) version of hegemonic theory and Organski/Kugler’s (1980) Power-
Transition theory) predict hegemonic war being fought between the dominant power and the 
challenger. However, there are some instances where wars can be avoided. As Kugler stated: 
 “Power transition research supports claims that overtakings are dangerous when policy makers 
 fail to accommodate them. …Rather, the political negotiations among contenders determine 
 whether potential challengers can be made satisfied with the rules and norms governing world 
 politics. If the declining dominant state is able to engineer a satisfactory compromise…., war 
 is not expected. If the two sides remain intransigent, war is expected” (Kugler 2006, 40). 
  
 Nevertheless, hegemonic war is a distinct feature in all of these theories. If fought, it 
will create a new system of states commensurate with their respective powers. The question 
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that becomes more salient is whether such system-wide wars are likely in present time, 
especially when two opposing nations both possess nuclear weapons which can effectively 
wipe out any gains realized in such wars. 
 Despite accepting the restraining effects of nuclear weapons in war and politics, 
political theorists usually downplay their role in theory building. Politicians and policymakers, 
however, do not discount nuclear weapons or states possessing nuclear weapons in their 
decision making. Events in recent history provide ample evidence to believe in the 
significance of nuclear weapons. We do not have to look further than a decision to depose 
nuke-less Saddam and his rule while Kim Jong-il still defies Western powers. NATO would 
have been unlikely to bomb Libya if Gaddafi had a functioning nuclear program. Also, the 
absence of a full-blown war between two nuclear nations should not go unnoticed, even 
though the span of time in consideration is very short.  
 If the international system is anarchic, then nuclear weapons have brought some 
semblance of order into the system. They have reduced the security dilemma among states 
with second strike capabilities by making nuclear war against them costly. Nuclear deterrence 
also stops an aggressor from making existential threats or initiating war against other nuclear 
capable states. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union and the United States 
chose to fight proxy wars in the forests of Southeast Asia and in the mountains of 
Afghanistan rather than confront each other directly as Hitler and Roosevelt ‘s armies did. 
Nuclear weapons seem to have definitely disrupted the cycles of hegemonic war in world 
politics. 
 If the destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes hegemonic wars very costly, are 
there any other ways through which states can surpass the entrenched power? One way is 
through peaceful transition. We have seen this happen frequently in world politics. The most 
salient example is the peaceful transition between Great Britain and the United States 
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beginning in the late nineteenth century. Additionally, we have seen power transitions 
between second rate powers occur in recent decades without any significant disruption. As 
China has surpassed every other power but the US in material capabilities, we have yet to see 
any conflagration between China and the countries it surpassed like Germany and Japan. 
 Instead of hegemonic wars to renew the system, the dominant power may simply 
disintegrate or dissolve as happened with the Soviet Union. As Gilpin (1981) points out, the 
hegemon may simply fall under the burden of its overexpansion and the costs associated with 
it. Over-consumption at home, declining growth rates and the diffusion of technology may 
lead to gradual eroding of a hegemon’s power. Of course, Gilpin does see an eventual 
confrontation between the challenger and the hegemon. Whether such confrontation will 
evolve into a systemic war of elimination is the biggest question of our time. 
 In this chapter, I discussed China’s responses to its increase in relative power. 
Contrary to the prediction of the balance of power theory, there is little evidence of explicit 
balancing behavior by China against the reigning hegemon. The structure of unipolarity has 
its own constraints on the traditional response of alliance formation since such acts are 
overtly revisionist and would warrant a harsh rebuke from the powerful hegemon. To 
exacerbate the problem the challenger faces, it is also confronted by a security dilemma 
generated by its rise–similar to China’s East Asian neighbors’ concerns about increasingly 
powerful China. As a result, the challenger has to find other ways of undermining the 
hegemon, whether it is through internal development, promotion of multilateralism or active 
diplomacy. Chinese foreign policy seems to include all the features mentioned above.  
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  CHAPTER IV 
     DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS ON CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 
 In the last chapter, I attempted to link the constraints of the international structure and 
the role of relative power on Chinese foreign policy. Neoclassical realists assume that states 
are primarily motivated by these factors. However, they also believe that these factors alone 
do not entirely explain the process of policy formulation. Foreign policies are made 
ultimately by policy elites who are themselves mindful of domestic politics as well. The 
perceptions of these elites, regime security, consensus among them, and the strength of social 
cohesion are important factors that play intervening roles in foreign policy creation. To 
neglect these constraints of domestic policy in explanations or interpretations of a state’s 
international behavior will not only result in an incomplete, but a wrong, picture. Fortunately, 
neoclassical realists take this lesson to heart.  
 Following the Cold War, the chief assertion among Chinese elites about US foreign 
policy is that it is mainly concerned with maintaining hegemony and checking the rise of any 
other nation capable of challenging its unique position. The view that multipolarity would 
dawn gave away to one which saw enduring US preponderance, as the events of the 1990s 
folded. The intervention in Taiwan and Kosovo solidified Chinese opinions that the US is an 
unchecked power with “an offensive-oriented, ‘neo-imperialist,’ ‘neo-interventionist’ 
strategy geared toward expanding, perpetuating, and imposing its worldwide hegemony” 
(Deng 2001, 350). The foreign policy choices under the George W. Bush administration; the 
withdrawal from ABM Treaty, rejection of Kyoto Protocol and invasion of Iraq by 
circumventing the UN Security Council, only solidified such opinions. US sales of weapons 
to Taiwan were decried by Chinese leaders which saw this US policy as an attempt to prevent 
the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. They were troubled particularly by the 
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American plan to expand the theatre missile defense system in Northeast Asia including 
Japan and Taiwan. 
 Chinese elites saw the American policy of continued criticism of Chinese human 
rights and interference in Taiwan as an affront to China’s sovereignty. They were especially 
wary humanitarian interventions in Kosovo and Somalia based upon the concept of limited 
sovereignty. To them, such practices only manifested the heavy-handedness of US foreign 
policy and the imposition of Western values on Easterners. Victories in high-tech and 
minimum casualty wars in the Gulf and the Balkans altered the psyche of the US, which 
Chinese describe as a “Gulf War Syndrome”–an essential lowering of the threshold for the 
use of violence. The 1999 Chinese Embassy bombing in Belgrade and the incident involving 
a Chinese fighter and a US reconnaissance plane in 2001 only solidified such perceptions 
among the Chinese public.  
 While all these events have shaped Chinese perceptions of the US as a belligerent 
power bent on imposing its will and maintaining its super power status, they have also 
opened up scrutiny on China’s military backwardness. They have also become aware of 
America’s ability to maneuver in international regimes to produce favorable outcomes to 
promote its agenda. Therefore, the common analysis among China’s policy elites is that 
despite the US’s hard-headed approach, China should steer clear of direct confrontation with 
the US and instead focus on internal development and diplomacy American power. 
Regime Security   
 In a December 1995 speech at a meeting of the Central Military Commission, 
President Jiang Zemin revisited the importance of PLA’s role in maintaining the CCP’s 
power as such, “…the PLA is an armed body that carries out the political tasks of the Party 
and adopts the purposes and objectives of the Party as its own” (Zemin 2010, 476). In an 
unofficial but highly circulated transcript of 2004 Christmas Eve speech titled “Historical 
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Missions of the Armed Forces for the New Stage in the New Century,” Hu Jintao reiterated 
the consolidation of the ruling status of the Communist Party as one of four major tasks for 
the PLA (U.S. Congress 2009). The official White Papers on Chinese National Defense of 
2008 contains following paragraph: 
 “The PLA insists on putting ideological and political work first, and pushing forward the 
 innovative development of ideological and political work, to ensure the Party's absolute 
 leadership over the armed forces, the scientific development of the military, the all-round 
 development of the officers and men, the increase of combat capabilities and the effective 
 fulfillment of historical missions” (China Government 2009a). 
  
 Though the democratic forces were decisively defeated during the domestic upheavals 
between 1989 and 1991, the CCP is immensely worried about the security and the legitimacy 
of its regime. Thus, the emphasis by the party leaders on the political indoctrination of the 
PLA has been a common theme throughout communist rule. As Deng abandoned the legacy 
of Marxism and Leninism and instead promoted the socialist market economy, the 
ideological attraction of communism has been shrinking. The opening of China for foreign 
capital has brought along Western ideas that are incompatible with the CCP’s autocratic 
regime. Though the party has been able to put a tight leash on political protests and anti-
government activities, mass protests do occur. The frequency of such protests has increased 
as income inequality and corruption have risen in recent years. Mass protests have erupted 
due to layoffs, unemployment and poor working conditions in factories in urban areas. In 
rural and suburban areas, farmers and residents are equally being agitated by the local 
officials seizing their lands and properties in the name of economic development, as well as 
by environmental degradation brought about by excessive industrialization and haphazard 
mining operations. 
 Despite all these problems at hand, the main attraction of the CCP to the Chinese 
people is its ability to sustain economic growth at home. The Chinese populace has seen its 
per capita GDP increase fourteen fold since 1990 (World Bank 2010; WB hereafter). Starting 
from the abject poverty and famine endured during the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese 
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populace has enjoyed the prosperity brought by market reforms. The challenge to the CCP 
regime is whether it can maintain the same level of economic growth and channel those 
economic gains to the marginalized Chinese working class, rural farmers, and the people in 
the frontiers. Consequently, the Chinese government acted swiftly with its 2008 economic 
stimulus package in the wake of falling demand and rising unemployment due to the 
economic crisis in the United States. Many analysts also attribute the unwillingness of 
Chinese government to adjust its currency exchange rate to the fact that any appreciation in 
the yuan will make Chinese exports more expensive, which will eventually lead to 
unemployment.  
 The CCP also has to deal with a movement towards self-determination among ethnic 
minorities on its Western frontiers. The province of Xinjiang is the center of a separatist 
movement of ethnic Uyghurs fighting for their hoped-for state of “East Turkestan”. Tibet has 
seen its share of flare ups in recent years–the most notable being the protests during the 2008 
Summer Olympics in Beijing. Western China, which is made up of nine provinces, three 
autonomous regions and one central government controlled municipality is home to 70 % of 
China’s minority population (China Government 2009b). Out of China’s 13,670.17 miles 
land border, 11,806 miles runs through minority regions (China Government 2009b). 
Therefore, the regime understands the importance of maintaining minorities’ allegiance 
towards the state. If the regime fails to protect the territorial integrity whether it’s in the West 
or in Tibet or in Taiwan, it will no longer be seen as a guardian of the Chinese state and its 
demise will begin to unfold.  
 So, it is not surprising that China chose to settle its border disputes with the Central 
Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well as Russia and Vietnam, given 
the priority the regime places on the stability in border regions. In most of these border 
compromises, China accepted far less than it claimed. For instance, in a compromise with 
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Kyrgyzstan, China only received 32% of the disputed land whereas in another settlement with 
Kazakhstan, China only received 22% of the disputed land (Fravel 2005). Fravel suggests 
that China’s penchant for territorial compromise can be explained by the necessity to 
maintain stability in its frontier regions–the destabilization of which will cause the Chinese 
people to question the regime’s effectiveness. Going further back to 1960s, Fravel points out 
that China settled its land disputes with both Burma and Nepal next to the border of revolting 
Tibet. Earlier in 1950s, similar talks were stalled and China showed no willingness to accede 
to demands made by Burma and Nepal. But, when the situation in Tibet got worse, the 
settlements were swift and China only received 18% of disputed land from Burma and 6% of 
contested territory from Nepal and half of Mt. Everest.  
 China’s compromises in these instances are puzzling because China undeniably had 
the upper hand because of its superior military capabilities. But, the settlements make sense 
when the domestic constraint imposed by regime security is put in perspective. Fravel claims 
that “internal conflict often creates conditions for cooperation, producing a “diversionary 
peace” instead of war” (Fravel 2005, 49). Whether such cooperation can be achieved in a 
different range of issues is questionable. Nevertheless, it can be said that China made 
concessions on territorial disputes in order to improve security and maintain stability in its 
volatile frontier regions. 
Elite Consens/Elite Cohesion 
 Schweller regards elite consensus/disagreement as “the most proximate cause of a 
state’s response or nonresponse to external threats,” whereas elite cohesion “concerns the 
degree to which a central government’s political leadership is fragmented by persistent 
internal divisions” (Schweller, 2004, 170-180). In the neoclassical realist formulation of 
foreign policy decision making, both of these variables play influential roles. To recognize 
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them is to accept that governmental leaders make foreign policy decisions ultimately, not the 
states.  
 Elite consensus and elite cohesion in China are maintained by the CCP and its 
structure. The decisions are made by select few elites at top level and disseminated to 
underlings whose function is to build and find consensus among lower level party officials 
and the general public, whether through indoctrination or propaganda. Foreign policy 
decision making is a highly centralized affair and “highly reflective of one individual’s or a 
certain set of individual’s perceptions, tendencies, and preferences” (Zhao 1996, 79). The 
process has evolved since the early days of CCP rule when it was totally authoritarian under 
Mao. Many credit Deng Xiaoping for making half way change–a consultative authoritarian 
model as Harry Harding (1987) calls it. In the model forwarded, the final decisions on bigger 
foreign policy issue still funnel through few at the top or the apex but consultations are made 
with important constituencies in the lower level. David Lampton and Kenneth Liberthal 
(1992) have put forth a “fragmented authoritarianism model” which posits that the decision 
making process is concentrated at the top, but fragmented and decentralized in lower levels. 
In recent years, as China’s contact with the outside world has become more frequent and the 
decision making portfolio has enlarged, the foreign policy bureaucracy underneath the main 
leadership level has become more professionalized and is allowed to handle routine foreign 
policy matters. However, the biggest and most complicated tasks are reserved for the CCP’s 
Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) comprised of nine members from the CCP’s Politburo. 
The table below lists current nine members of PSC with their respective state and party 
portfolios. 




Table 4: Members of the CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee and their Portfolios. 
Leaders                 Party Position             State Position 
Hu Jintao General Secretary of the CCP 
Central Committee/Chairman of the 
CCPCMC 




Party secretary of the Standing 
Committee of the NPC 





Party secretary of the State Council 
of the PRC 
Premier of the State Council of the PRC 
 
Jia Qinglin Party secretary of the National 
Committee of the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference 
Chairman of the National Committee of the 





Chairman of the CCP Central 
Guidance Commission for Building 
Spiritual Civilization 
 
Xi Jinping Top-ranked Secretary of the Central 
Secretariat of the CCP/Vice 
Chairman of the CCPCMC 
/President of the Central Party 
School of the CCP 
Vice President of the PRC/Vice Chairman 
of the PRCCMC 
 
Li Keqiang Deputy Party secretary of the State 
Council of the PRC 
Top-ranked Vice Premier of the State 




Secretary of the CCP Central 





Secretary of the CCP Central 
Political and Legislative Committee 
 
  Source: Compiled from the official websites of Chinese Government and the Communist Party. Accessed at        
 http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/; http://www.gov.cn/english/ 
Notes: CCP= Communist Party of China; PRC= People’s Republic of China; CCPCMC= Chinese Communist 
Party’s Central Military Commission; PRCCMC= People’s Republic of China’s Central Military Commission.  
  
 As the table above shows, the same person holds different positions at the triumvirate 
of party, state and military. For instance, Hu and Xi are number one and number six in the 
hierarchy of the CCP. They are also the President and the Vice-President of the State 
respectively. Lastly, they also serve as chairman and vice chairman of the Party and the State 
Military Commissions. Experts believe these two members of the PSC are most active in 
foreign policy matters because Hu and Xi are also Chair and Vice Chair of CCP’s Foreign 
Affairs Leading Small Group–a body which is believed to “review major foreign policy 
issues and make recommendations to Politburo Standing Committee for action” (U.S. Senate 
2011, 3). The State Council, the official administrative body of PRC headed by Wen Jiabao 
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represents China in foreign relations, and therefore is influential in foreign policy. The State 
Councillor, Dai Bingguo, who is simultaneously a member of the Leading Party Members' 
Group of the State Council, director of the office of the foreign affairs leading group of the 
CCP Central Committee, director of the office of the national security work leading group of 
the CCP Central Committee, vice-minister of foreign affairs, and member of the CCP 
Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is regarded as one of the most influential 
foreign policy actors because of his extensive experience in foreign policy matters (China 
Government 2008; SIPRI 2010b, 11; U.S. Senate 2011, 3).  
 The role of the PLA in foreign policy making is real however experts disagree as to 
how important its role remains due to the push toward professionalization of the Army and 
the separation of armed forces from civilian decision making (U.S. Congress 2010, 10). As a 
result, military officials who retired from top positions in the CCP were replaced by civilian 
officers, and currently there is no representation from the PLA in the PSC. Even then, the role 
of the PLA remains significant in the matters of defense, arms procurement and sales, and 
proliferation. It can still voice its opinion through the CMC which is chaired by President Hu 
Jintao and where nine out of eleven members are represented by the PLA’s leaders. 
 The list of other actors beneath the central leadership that are involved in the creation 
of foreign policy or that are influential in the process includes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA), the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), Xinhua News 
Agency, the CCP Central Committee International Liaison Department, and the PLA General 
Staff Department. There are also peripheral actors which produce inputs to the process and 
include government sponsored research institutions, think tanks and local and provincial 
governments. 
 Despite the close-knit appearance of the foreign policy apparatus, frictions among 
various groups have become evident in recent years. The most high profile case that 
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illustrated foreign policy division occurred during the Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009, 
where MFA officials wanted to promote compromises so that China would not be regarded as 
an agreement-spoiler. However, the National Development and Reform Commission which is 
responsible for domestic politics on climate change did not budge from its initial position 
which was to prevent setting fixed targets of carbon emission for both developed and 
developing countries despite Premier Wen Jiabao’s sympathy for MFA’s compromising 
attitude (SIPRI 2010b, 8-9). Another instance that puzzles foreign relations observers is the 
PLA’s reluctance to maintain sustained military to military relationships with its American 
counterparts even after President Hu’s pledges were spelled out in joint agreements signed in 
2009 and 2011 with President Barack Obama (U.S. Senate 2011, 4). 
 The true mettle of Chinese elite consensus and cohesiveness will be tested in the 18
th
 
Party Congress in 2012 when the current leadership positions will be vacated by the President, 
along with other membership positions in PSC. The current Vice-President Xi Jingping and 
Vice-Premier Li Keqiang are rumored to replace Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao in the PSC and 
take Presidency and Premiership (Miller 2008, 7). Aside from these two vacancies, there will 
be more PSC and Politburo seats up for grabs and those jockeying for positions are Li 
Yuanchao, Liu Yunshan, Ling Jihua, Wang Huning, Du Qinglin, Yang Jing, Cai Wu, Wang 
Jiarui, Shen Yueyue and Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai (Li 2011, 15). If the transition 
goes smoothly, the foreign policy decision making will remain static with the PSC as its 
nucleus. It will be interesting to see how this new batch of leaders will consolidate power 
after the transition and if any more decentralization will occur in policy formulation due to 
infightings among various groups for more influence. 
Discussion 
 In this chapter, I discussed how domestic constraints affect the Chinese decision 
making process. The United States is perceived as a hegemonic power bent on maintaining its 
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leading position but Chinese leaders do not want a direct confrontation because it will derail 
China off its developmental track. Given the perception of the US as an aggressive and an 
interventionist country with a lower threshold for using its military power, Chinese leaders 
are wary of US involvement in Taiwan, especially. Therefore, the PLA’s Navy has seen huge 
upgrades in its defensive and offensive capabilities in recent years. China has also been the 
first to decry any foreign interventions anywhere in the World, and has refused to levy hard 
sanctions against nations like Iran. This comes as no surprise since China has a number of 
minority groups with aspirations for self-determination. It has also sought good relations and 
has settled border disputes with countries bordering Tibet and the Xinjiang Autonomous 
Region in order to stabilize its frontiers. The creation of SCO was a way to solve its domestic 
problem through regional cooperation in issues like terrorism and separatism. Thus, China’s 
policies of regional cooperation and non-confrontation with the US are shaped by its 
domestic situations.        
 Additionally, the perceptions and preferences of the elites matter hugely in foreign 
policy decision making because the process is still limited to a select few even when the 
number of power centers is multiplying. Despite having a strong consensus among the elites, 
the current leadership is not as powerful as Mao or even Deng to make a radical change in 
policy all by itself. It has to make decisions based upon bargaining and consultation leading 
to delayed response in a crisis situation. This diffusion of power may lead to a policy 
stalemate and lack of coordination among foreign policy carriers. For instance, the security 
bloc may promote a policy of confrontation with the United States contrary to a policy of 
engagement favored by the economic bloc. This sort of infighting will hinder any coherent 
and effective policy response in an era speeded by globalization and where challenges to 
security are enormous due to nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Not helpful in the process is 
the rise of firebrand nationalism of Chinese netizens and their ability to steer national 
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discourse. The elites will have to be increasingly mindful of what their citizens are posting on 
the message-boards when they make decisions concerning China’s role in international 











































     CHAPTER V 
 
    CASE STUDY: CHINESE CURRECY POLICY 
 One of the most contentious points of disagreement in Sino-American relationship is 
the persistence of a huge trade deficit with China. The vocal critics include lawmakers from 
the political parties, manufacturers and trade unions. There are calls being made to toughen 
the stance with China regarding trade policies and resolve an array of grievances that include 
illegal subsidies, uneven labor standards, intellectual property theft, and currency 
undervaluation. As unemployment in the US is hovering above 8 %, the demand for actions 
is getting louder, especially on the currency exchange rate. Nobel laureate Paul Krugman 
estimated that at current level of exchange rate, 1.4 million US jobs will be lost in a couple of 
years to Chinese manufacturers (Krugman 2009). Fred C. Bergsten of the Peterson Institute 
of International Economics recently testified that the yuan is undervalued by about 15 % on 
trade-weighted basis and about 25 % against the dollar (U.S. House 2010). The US 
Department of Treasury Report (USDT) to Congress on International Economic and 
Exchange Rate Policies of July 2010 came just short of labelling China as a currency 
manipulator by concluding that the yuan is substantially undervalued (USDT 2010). The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2010 Article IV Staff Report for China maintained that 
the yuan is substantially below the level that is consistent with medium-term fundamentals 
(IMF 2010). The report pointed out three abnormalities that would suggest currency 
undervaluation: (1) the rapid pace of accumulation of foreign currency reserves held by the 
Central Bank that reached $2.4 trillion at the end of the first quarter of 2010; (2) the sizeable 
current account surplus of $297.1 billion in 2009 even though it spent hundred of billions on 
economic stimulus; and (3) the current level of the real exchange rate that is close to the level 
it was at in the late 1990s despite gaining huge productivity gains (IMF 2010, 19). 
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 China excercises a strict control over its exchange rate unlike most advanced 
economies where market based floating exchange rates are maintained. Between 1994 and 
July 2005, the yuan was pegged to the US dollar at about 8.28 yuan to the dollar. In July 2005, 
the yuan was appreciated against the dollar by 2.1% and moved to a managed float, based on 
a basket of major foreign currencies, including the US dollar. From July 2005 to July 2009, 
the yuan appreciated by 21 % and the dollar-yuan exchange rate went from 8.27 to 6.83 yuan 
per dollar (U.S. Congress 2011a, 1). However, the Chinese government has halted the 
appreciation of the yuan in the wake of the recent financial crisis and the yuan/dollar 
exchange rate has been kept relatively constant since July 2009 through June 2010 at 6.83. 
On June 19 2010, China returned to an exchange rate regime that would be more flexible and 
more market based, with the yuan allowed to trade within a band of plus/minus 0.5 % against the 
dollar on a daily basis. On June 21, the first trading day following China’s announcement, the 
yuan appreciated 0.43 %, the largest single day appreciation against the dollar since China’s 
initial 2.1 % revaluation on July 21, 2005 (USDT 2010, 18).  
 The huge foreign reserve accumulated in China has caused the yuan to lose its value, 
distorting market based prices. A cheaper yuan has an effect of making Chinese exports to the 
United States relatively inexpensive. It will also render US exports to China relatively 
expensive.  Hence, US exports to China decrease and those American goods and service 
industries that compete with China have to face huge pricing pressures from cheap Chinese 
exports. This has resulted in the shutting down of many US factories and the widening of the 
trade deficit, leading some analysts to find a direct correlation between the American trade 
deficit and American job losses, especially in the manufacturing sector. For instance, a study 
by the Economic Policy Institute shows that the US trade deficit with China through July 
2010 has increased by 18% over the same period last year. The overall deficit with China in 
2010 will lead to a loss of between 512,000 to 566,000 jobs (Scott 2010, 1). Moreover, an 
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undervalued yuan has forced other East Asian economies to intervene in currency markets to 
keep their currencies weak against the dollar in order to compete with Chinese goods. This 
has prevented in a real depreciation of the dollar to other Asian currencies, rendering US 
exports expensive throughout Asia. 
 There are three questions that are raised regarding Chinese currency policy.  First, 
how did China manage to consistently undervalue its currency without any significant 
repercussions? Second, what are the domestic and international determinations of Chinese 
currency policy? And, what does the future hold for the yuan? 
 In the May 1992 report to the Congress, the Treasury named China as a currency 
manipulator for the first time since the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 
required it to monitor and report semi-annually on currency regimes and trade practices of 
trading partners. China remained on the list until December 1994. The Treasury determined 
that China highly regulated its foreign currency allocation to importers and controlled imports 
by necessitating permits and requiring official letters to buy dollars. China also maintained a 
dual exchange rate system, one the official rate and another the market rate determined in its 
swap centers which were responsible for trading foreign exchanges at official auction rates. 
Hence, the Treasury welcomed China’s move to combine its dual exchange rate regimes on 
January 1, 1994 by pegging the yuan at 8.7 to the dollar, which was the prevalent market 
based rate. The new rate amounted to 33% overnight depreciation from official rate of 5.8. 
Nevertheless, China vowed to move to a market based socialist economy and reform its 
foreign exchange system. Consequently, the December 1994 Treasury report removed China 
from the list of currency manipulators.  
 There are number of reasons for the US’s deficient handling of the issue. First, the 
Clinton Administration’s engagement policy with China put the issue on the back burner. The 
significance of overall relation with China was far greater than the issue of currency 
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undervaluation. The Administration hoped to bring China into the mainstream of 
international politics and establish a strategic relationship in the post Cold War world by 
easing the relationship that had been strained since the Tiananmen Square Crisis. As a result, 
the US also stopped linking renewal of China’s MFN status to its human rights situation in 
1994–a reversal of a policy set by Clinton himself a year earlier. Second, the US took a soft 
approach because its multinationals were clamoring for access to Chinese markets. US 
exports to China was steadily rising since the early years of the decade and the Treasury’s 
reports in the subsequent years touted growing exports to China. For instance, the August 
1995 report credited recent yuan appreciation in real terms and growing economic activity in 
China for the surge in American exports (USDT 1995, 19). A year later, the August 1996 
report claimed that exports to China increased by 26.5% in 1995. Further, it also claimed that 
China was moving towards reduction of tariffs on some 4,000 items as a step to liberalize its 
economy in order to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO) (USDT 1996, 12-13).  
 Third, the trade deficit with China, although growing large, was not the largest one on 
a bilateral basis. In 1993, the trade deficit with China was only $22.8 billion, one third of 
deficit with Japan, which amounted to $60.5 billion (USDT 1994, 16). Besides, the US also 
had trade deficits with Korea and Taiwan which had been named currency manipulators 
numerous times (USDT 1994, 20-21). China was not the exclusive focus of the US regulators. 
Fourth, the US’s policy preference under Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin had been to 
maintain a strong dollar in international market throughout 1990s. This paragraph in 1996 
Treasury Report illustrates the acceptance of strong dollar policy; 
  “Throughout the period, US Treasury Secretary Rubin reiterated that “a strong dollar is in 
  the interest of the United States.” A strong dollar improves confidence in US assets and thus 
  contributes to lower interest rates and reduced capital costs to US business, expanding  
  investment in the US economy. A strong dollar contributes to sustaining the economic  
  expansion by holding down inflation and to raising real wages and living standards of  
  Americans” (USDT 1996, 6).  
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 Fifth, the United States maintained very impressive growth and surprisingly low 
unemployment throughout the 1990s, allowing it to overlook trade deficits with China. The 
unemployment rate fell down under 5 percent in 1997 and by 2000 it hovered around 4 
percent (See Table 5). The rate of GDP growth in the latter half of the decade was impressive 
too. From the first quarter of 1996 to the last quarter of 1999, the GDP grew on an average 
quarterly rate of 4.65 percent, a very high rate for a mature economy (See Table 6).  
    Table 5: Quarterly Unemployment Rate for the US (1996-1999), 16 Years and Over. 
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1996 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.3 5.5 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.4 5.4 
1997 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.1 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.9 4.7 4.6 4.7 
1998 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.4 
1999 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.0 
     Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011. 
    Table 6: Gross Domestic Product, Percentage Change from Preceding Period (1996-1999). 
Year             1996             1997            1998             1999 
 Qtr.   I  II  III IV    I II III IV I II III IV I II II IV 
 GDP 2.8 7.1 3.5 4.4 3.1 6.1 5.1 3.1 3.8 3.6 5.4 7.1 3.6 3.2 5.2 7.4 
   Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2011.  
 Finally, China did not devalue its currency during the Asian Financial Crisis contrary 
to the expectations of many experts including the Treasury. The crisis started when Thailand 
was unable to defend the Baht and had to float it, leading to its devaluation as well as the 
devaluations of other East Asian currencies. The yuan which was also pegged to the dollar 
lost its competitive advantage due to its appreciation. Like China, many of these nations were 
export-based economies competing in same product segments. An expensive yuan would 
render higher prices for Chinese exports in the international market. It was a foregone 
conclusion among experts that Beijing would devalue the yuan sooner or later. However, 
Beijing did the unexpected and chose not to devalue its currency, earning much goodwill 
among its East Asian neighbors. Instead of a currency manipulator, China was heralded as a 
good savior credited with saving East Asian economies by taking financial blows itself. 
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 However, there are few advantages to an undervalued yuan. The US producers who 
import capital equipment and parts made in China benefit due to lower costs which result in 
the final US product being cheaper and competitive in the world market. Likewise, many 
imports from China are produced by US-invested enterprises which benefit from an 
undervalued exchange rate. On the other hand, focus on trade-deficit leads to underestimation 
of the fact that millions of US consumers benefit from cheap and affordable Chinese products, 
ranging from garments to electronics. Also, trade statistics should be taken with a grain of 
salt. The way that country of origin is designated in international trade is arcane and dubious 
in that it fails to capture the reality of global production networks. In many instances, China 
serves just as a final assembly point of a product whose parts are produced all over the world, 
but China is accounted with the full cost of the product instead of some value in labor that is 
added in the final assembly. A very recent paper from the Asian Development Bank looks at 
the production cycle of a very popular Apple product, the I-Phone (Asian Development Bank 
2010; hereafter ADB). In 2009, I-Phones contributed $1.9 billion to the trade deficit with 
China if the traditional method is applied. However, the production of I-Phones is highly 
globalized, with research taking place in the US and major components made in Japan, 
Germany, South Korea and Taiwan. I-phones are produced in Shenzen, China by Foxconn, a 
Taiwanese contractor. Applying value added approach, China’s share was just mere 3.6% to 
the total final production cost of $178.96 for an I-phone which amounts to $6.5 per unit. The 
trade deficit on this product alone will come down to $73.45 million from $1.9 billion using 
the value added approach (ADB 2010, 5). 
 The job losses in the US in 2000s are real and significant, but there is no clear 
indication whether there is a link with Chinese imports. First, not all US manufacturers export 
to China or compete with Chinese imports.  Second, the economic recession in the early 
2000s increased unemployment across the entire economy and the jobs lost were not fully 
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recovered even after the recovery (Bernanke 2003). Finally, there is a long-run trend shift 
away from manufacturing toward the service sector. According to a Congressional report, 
employment in the manufacturing sector “as a share of total non-agricultural employment has 
fallen from 31.8% in 1960 to 22.4% in 1980, to 10.7% in 2005, to 10.5% in 2006” (U.S. 
Congress 2008, 30). This trend is much larger than the Chinese currency issue, and is caused 
by changing technology, productivity gains and shifts in comparative advantage.  The issue 
of Chinese currency rate has really been become salient in economic conversation in the 
domestic front only in the last few years. 
 Under all these circumstances, US regulators were very slow and unwilling to respond 
to the perceived currency undervaluation by China. Despite China’s huge current account 
balance against the US and its increasing foreign reserves, there was no willingness to 
confront China since the Administration forged the policy of engagement. Increasing exports 
to China which also relaxed its tariff structure as a step towards WTO membership also sent 
mixed signals to the US regulators. The policy of maintaining a strong dollar and an 
impressive economic growth at home discouraged American actions during 1990s.  
 The Bush Administration came with a resolve to settle economic issues with China 
and was heading towards confrontation when the events of September 11, 2001 completely 
shifted its priorities. Congress occasionally raised the issue but did not enact any significant 
legislation. The issue got bigger in the 109
th
 Congress when Senator Charles Schumer 
(Democrat, New York) and Senator Lindsey Graham (Republican, South Carolina), 
introduced the China Currency Bill (S 295) calling for 27.5% tariffs on all Chinese imports if 
China did not appreciate its currency by 27.5%. The bill got significant traction in the Senate 
despite an attempt to kill it by a pro-free trade group of lawmakers. Senator Schumer 
eventually agreed to pull it back in exchange for a full Senate Committee hearing. But, the 
message was sent to the Chinese, especially when the Currency Bill attracted a broad 
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bipartisan support. On July 21
st
 2005, few months after the introduction of bill on February, 
China removed the yuan from a decade-old peg against the dollar and implemented a 
managed float against a basket of currencies. The yuan was re-valued effectively by 2.1% to 
8.11 against the dollar and it could float in a tight band of 0.3% on daily basis.  
 While international pressure seemed to have influenced the Chinese decision to 
revalue the yuan, there were some domestic reasons behind such a move. Inflation has been 
particularly a big headache for the Chinese authorities. The increasing supply of money due 
to a positive account balance and a huge trade surplus has led to an upward price movement 
in food prices and the property market.  Although inflation had not been as acute as in the 
mid 1990s when it was upwards of 10% on annual basis, there was a steady rise of inflation 
in the middle years of 2000s. In 2004, the rate of inflation was 3.9% and while it crept 
downwards to manageable 1.8% and 1.46% in the next two years respectively, it again 
climbed back to 4.7% in 2007. The fact that increasing food prices hurt the Chinese working 
class is not lost on the leaders of the CCP. In a report presented to the National People’s 
Congress in 2008, Wen stated that the “price hikes and increasing inflationary pressures are 
the biggest concern of the people” (Jiabao 2008). In order to check food prices he also 
promised to “implement the system of provincial governors assuming responsibility for the 
‘rice bag’ (grain supply) program and city mayors for the ‘vegetable basket’ (non-staple food 
supply) program” (Jiabao 2008).  
 Besides putting inflationary pressure on Chinese citizens via an influx of foreign 
money due to increased exports, a cheaper yuan also means less consumer purchasing power 
and thus less domestic consumption. This is worrisome because low purchasing power hold 
back the living standard of ordinary Chinese citizens. Second, it also keeps China reliant on 
exports for domestic growth rather than on domestic consumption. Therefore, it is in China’s 
own interest to appreciate the yuan and the leaders are fully aware of it. For instance, the 
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Report on the Work of the Government presented by Wen to the State Council on March 5
th
, 
2004 includes the following statements: 
  “We should make full use of the role of monetary policy, appropriately control the size of 
  credit and optimize the credit structure to support economic growth while fending off inflation 
  and financial risks. We will work to basically balance international payments and keep the 
  exchange rate for the Renminbi basically stable at a proper and balanced level” (Jiabao 2004). 
  
A similar report in 2008 by Wen contained the following paragraph: 
  “The decision to follow a tight monetary policy was based on the following considerations: the 
  strong possibility of resurgence in fixed asset investment, continued excessive supplies of 
  money and credit, the still-unsolved problem of excess liquidity, and considerable inflationary 
  pressure. For these reasons, we must improve financial regulation to control the excessively 
  rapid growth in the supplies of money and credit” (Jiabao 2008). 
  
 It is evident that the Chinese leaders are worried about the domestic implications of an 
undervalued yuan as much as they are influenced by the international pressure. In fact, a case 
can be made that the Chinese leaders give more weight to the domestic considerations on this 
matter. In a luncheon with a visiting US Chamber of Commerce delegation in March of 2005, 
Wen cautioned that “reform of the yuan's exchange rate is a matter of China's own 
sovereignty. Any pressure or media play-up, or politicising an economic matter, will not help 
solve problems" (Jiabao 2005) It is increasingly important for China’s leaders to maintain an 
appearance of independence in its monetary policy in front of a nationalistic domestic crowd. 
Even if nationalism is not high on the list, there are other domestic considerations which 
shape their decision making on exchange rate regime. As the Governor Zhou Xiaochuan of 
People’s Bank of China (PBC) reiterated in a 2006 speech, “China as a large developing 
economy with heavy employment pressures and a still fragile financial system, could only 
adopt a gradualist approach to adjust its economy in a controllable manner”(Xiaochuan 2006). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that China has maintained a slow and a guided appreciation of 
the yuan against the dollar despite the calls for swift action.  
 There are two major constituencies within China which are influential in the currency 
regime. First, the exporters guided by NDRC, which is charged with coordinating national 
economic and industrial policies, support a depreciated yuan. Second, the reformists in the 
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PBOC, who are charged with implementing sound monetary policy and checking inflation, 
prefer a more flexible currency. While the course of actions China has led towards a float 
based regime supported by the reformers, it is hard to say when and if the yuan will truly be 
exchangeable and free in the currency market. The view in the United States that only market 
based currency rate is fair is not necessarily shared by the Chinese officials. In the same 
speech in which he called for some forbearance on the yuan appreciation, Governor Zhou 
protested: 
  “According to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, “member countries shall have the right 
  to choose exchange rate regime, either free floating, managed floating or fixed exchange rate, 
  at their own discretion”. In this sense, there exists no such an exchange rate regime that can be 
  labelled as “manipulating exchange rate”. China’s gradual shift from a relatively fixed  
  arrangement to an exchange rate regime with greater flexibility in line with the needs of  
  economic reform and opening up has won extensive support from the world community, and 
  those criticisms wrongly accused this action  as “manipulating exchange rate” will not be  
  widely accepted” (Xiaochuan 2006).  
  
 Therefore, it should not come as a surprise when China intervenes in its currency 
market if it finds intervention necessary. However, the act of balancing both domestic and 
international pressures on its currency regime has increasingly turned difficult. For instance, 
in the heat of global financial crisis in 2008, China pegged the yuan back against the dollar at 
6.83. While it seemed to be an emergency measure directed at maintaining stability in a 
volatile global market, leaving the yuan as it was would have surely depreciated its value 
because the majority of currencies in the basket against which the yuan was floating since 
2005 were losing their values. Given that the rates of annual growth of exports were just 8 % 
in 2008 and a negative 10 % in 2009, depreciation would have been good for Chinese exports 
and would have reduced unemployment pressure at home (See Table 7). But, the Chinese 
officials did not let the yuan depreciate and kept the exchange rate fixed similar to its actions 
during the Asian Financial Crisis a decade ago. One explanation for such move would be that 
China did not want to see the US’s trade deficit worsen even more. As its major trading 
partner, it is necessarily not in the interest of China to see an economically challenged United 
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States. Nevertheless, as China intends to move towards more market based currency regime, 
it will gradually lose its absolute control over the yuan. 
      Table 7: Chinese Exports (2005-2010) 
 Series Name 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Exports of goods and services (constant 2000 
$, billions) 791.8 980.9 1175.5 1247.4 1142.1 1422.8 
Exports of goods and services  
of GDP) 37 39 38 35 27 29 
Exports of goods and services (annual % 
growth) 24 24 20 8 -10 25 
Source: IMF Database, Accessed at www.imf.org, on November 20, 2011. 
The Future of the Yuan 
 Besides being the richest nation and the largest economy in the world, there are three 
other reasons that have helped the United States become the most influential player in the 
global financial market. First, the role of the dollar as the world’s main reserve currency 
enables the United States to finance its huge current account deficit. Second, there is a huge 
appetite for the dollar denominated bonds in the global financial market because of the 
certainty and the stability associated with the US financial system. Third, the US dominates 
the global institutions of finance like the IMF and the World Bank through which it promotes 
policies that serve its best interests. These three factors aid the US in maintaining its position 
as a lead nation in the global financial system. 
 These facts are not lost on the Chinese leaders. If China is to be a true rival to the US, 
then it is one of the requirements that the yuan challenge the hegemony of the dollar as well. 
Looking at the Chinese government’s policies in the last two decades, there are some signs 
that can be interpreted as a move towards enhancing the yuan as a competitor currency to the 
dollar. But, these are just some baby steps and a resolute determination cannot be made from 
such moves. It is hard to assess China’s policies with any certainty because of their gradual 
and incremental approach and the lack of a distinct policy signal. Nevertheless, it suits our 
purpose to study them even though some of them are in infancy. 
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 In a much circulated essay by the Governor Zhou of PBC released on March 23, 2009, 
he called for an international reserve currency that is decoupled from any individual national 
currency (Xiaochuan 2009). Without directly naming the US, he cautioned clearly about the 
negative impact of the deteriorating US economy on the global financial system due to the 
dollar’s status as the main reserve currency. According to Zhou, “the crisis again calls for 
creative reform of the existing international monetary system towards an international reserve 
currency with a stable value, rule-based issuance and manageable supply, so as to achieve the 
objective of safeguarding global economic and financial stability” (Xiaochuan, 2009). From 
Chinese perspective, everything Zhou said made sense because the global financial system 
was suffering due to the domestic housing crisis and profligate US spending. The essay 
appeared just a little more than a week after a similar proposal was made by Russia which 
stated that “the obsolescent unipolar world economic order should be replaced by a system 
based on the interaction of several major centers” (Russia Government 2009). Together, these 
releases made headlines around the world. Coming out just a week before the 2009 G-20 
Summit in London, these statements reflected Chinese frustration at its dependence on the US 
dollar for its financial health since most of its savings are held in dollar assets. It can also be 
seen as a pushback by China against the United States and the EU who made Chinese 
currency issue headlines during the past summits. 
 China has also started allowing the issuance of the yuan denominated bonds by 
foreign financial and non-financial firms to raise capital as a part of the internationalization of 
the yuan. In August 2010, McDonald's issued yuan denominated bonds in Hong Kong, 
becoming the first foreign non-financial firm to do so (See Table 8). Caterpillar Inc. 
immediately followed suit (See Table 8). Similarly, Guggenheim Investments and Invesco 
rolled out yuan denominated bonds on the New York Stock Exchange for the first time in 
September 2011 (See Table 8). Investor demand for these yuan denominated international 
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bonds have been very positive and as the Chinese Central Bank relaxes control over capital 
flows, there will be more offerings in the bond market.  
 All these developments do not bode well for the status of the dollar as the global 
reserve currency. While the position of the dollar is unchallenged at the moment, the future is 
uncertain because of rising budget deficits and GDP/debt ratio. Meanwhile, China continues 
to impress with spectacular growth rates and current account surpluses. As China’s financial 
market liberalizes along with a healthy economy, investors will be attracted more to yuan 
denominated bonds instead of US financial products. Additionally, as China allows for the 
settlement of trades in the yuan with its trading partners, the use of dollar will likely diminish. 
Recently, in November of 2010, China and Russia signed an agreement to allow for the use 
of their own currencies in their interstate trades, instead of the dollar. In July 2009, China 
launched a trial program which allowed firms in select cities to settle transactions in its own 
currency. It also named Hong Kong as the international center for the yuan settlement. About 
7% of China's foreign trade is settled in yuan in the first quarter of 2011, most of it with 
Hong Kong (See Table 8). By the end of April 2011, yuan deposits in Hong Kong climbed to 
511 billion yuan ($79 billion), or 8.4% of total deposits (See Table 8). 
 Aside from the promotion of its usage and the creation of the international bond 
market for the yuan, China’s involvement in the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) also reduces US 
influence in the global financial market. Originally founded as a multilateral currency swap 
agreement between APT members in 2000, the initiative also launched a reserve fund 
amounting to $120 billion in 2010 in order to intervene in liquidity crisis similar to the AFC 
of 1996. China and Japan are the biggest contributors to the fund with $38 billion shares each. 
With the proper functioning of such a regime and gradual increase of the reserve amount, 
Northeast Asian states will have a better option in the CMI than the IMF in the future if a 
liquidity crisis reoccurs. The US has been able to excercise significant influence around the 
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globe through the Bretton Woods institutions-the importance of which will be diminished if 
the CMI truly becomes an alternative to the IMF.  
 Looking at Chinese currency and monetary policies provide a hint as to how overall 
Chinese foreign policy works. Its exchange rate policy is mainly a function of its domestic 
politics and economic necessities. China has resisted international calls for a quick 
appreciation of the yuan in order to manage a smooth transition of the yuan into a market 
based regime. While it has responded to international pressures in some instances, those 
actions came only when the calls for the change became very intense. Even then, Chinese 
leaders made sure to tell others that China would not buckle under any outside pressures and 
that its currency policy was solely a domestic matter. Within China, the decision regarding 
the currency policy is made at the top but there is significant divergence in policy preference 
under the apex of decision making. The NDRC along with the exporters prefer a cheaper 
yuan while the PBOC is worried more about the inflation that comes with a depreciated yuan.  
 The internationalization aspect of the yuan is troubling to US policy makers. While it 
might be long before the yuan poses a serious risk to the status of the dollar, the Chinese are 
incrementally building a framework to promote the yuan as an alternative in trade and in 
financial instruments. By creating regional financial institution in the CMI, China seeks to 
reduce influence from the outside actors in Northeast Asia. Being the region’s largest 
economy, as well as, one of the two biggest contributors to the CMI fund, China will be able 
to forward its agenda in the arrangement. Any success in fending off the involvement of the 
IMF and the US in a future financial crisis will be a huge foreign policy victory for China. 
This will only cast into doubt the notion that US leadership is indispensible in solving 
international crisis thereby delegitimizing the undue influence of the United States. This 
approach is not of a direct confrontation and like the overall nature of Chinese foreign policy 
seeks a way to increase China’s own influence. 
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Table 8: Timeline of Chinese Currency Policy (1994-2011). 
Date Actions 
Jan. 1, 1994 China combines its dual exchange-rate system by adopting the market rate of 
8.7 which is a depreciation of 33% overnight of the official rate of 5.8. The 
move is heralded as a step towards establishing a socialist market economy.  
Dec. 1, 1996 Yuan is made fully convertible into foreign currencies for trade purposes but 
severe limitations are imposed on trading foreign currencies to make loans and 
investments. 
1997-99 China wins praise for its commitment to not devalue the yuan during the 
Asian financial crisis. The yuan is pegged at 8.28 through frequent 
interventions. 
2001-05 China eases its capital controls after joining the WTO, but international 
pressures mount to quickly adjust the exchange rate. 
Feb 2004 Hong Kong banks can now offer limited retail yuan banking services. 
July 21, 2005   A peg against the dollar is rescinded and a managed float based on a basket of 
currencies is implemented. The yuan is revalued by 2.1% overnight to 8.11. 
July 2007 The first yuan-denominated bonds are sold in Hong Kong. 
Jul 08-Jun10 China moves yuan back to dollar peg at 6.83 amidst global financial crisis. 
July 2009 A trial program to allow companies in select cities to settle trades in yuan. 
Hong Kong is named a pilot city to receive settlements. 
June 19, 2010 China moves back to managed float after two-year hiatus.  
July 19, 2010 Yuan clearing in Hong Kong is expanded, and offshore yuan trading begins  
Aug. 20, 
2010 
McDonald's becomes the first non-financial foreign company to issue yuan 
bonds in Hong Kong, followed by Caterpillar Inc. 
Nov. 2010 China and Russia signed an agreement to allow for the use of their own 
currencies in their interstate trades, instead of the dollar. 
Oct 1, 2010 China allows select exporters to keep some of their foreign-currency earnings 
offshore in a trial program. 
Jan, 2011 The World Bank issued its first bond denominated in Chinese yuan in Hong 
Kong. 
Jan. 12, 2011 Bank of China opens yuan trading for US customers at its branches.  
Jan. 13, 2011 China launches a pilot program to let domestic companies use yuan for 
investments outside China. 
Feb. 4, 2011 US Treasury says China's exchange rate is "substantially undervalued" but 
declines to name China a currency manipulator 
March-April About 7% of China's foreign trade is settled in the yuan in the first quarter, 
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Source: Compiled from Wall Street Journal, Financial Times and REUTERS. 
CONCLUSION 
 In this study of Chinese foreign policy decision making, I have looked at both 
structural and domestic factors that affect the process. First, I looked into the constraints 
posed by the structure of the international system on decision making process. Despite 
China’s growing power and the prediction of neorealism that states tend to balance against 
the hegemon, China has refrained from employing balancing tactics. This is not only due to 
the fact that the US can punish such a move but also because so many powers have chosen to 
bandwagon with the United States. Meanwhile, China has hugely benefited from the peace 
and stability that unipolarity has brought and its material capability has been enhanced 
greatly in a very short time. A neorealist would expect that China will begin to balance as 
soon as it reaches power parity with the United States. Here again, the balance of power 
thesis faces significant problem. The same security dilemma that is supposed to bring the 
contending states closer to a conflict hinders the challenging state in its quest for dominance. 
This is evident in Northeast Asia. As Chinese might has grown, so have the concerns among 
its neighbors in ASEAN and Russia. Instead of focusing its efforts in devising ways to 
challenge the dominant power, China has to spend time allaying fears among its neighbors by 
embracing multilateralism and effective diplomacy. The close proximity, historical 
grievances and animosity among the actors in the region only enhances the security dilemma. 
This fact of interstate politics has been very much neglected by international relation theorists. 
Constrained by the security dilemma generated by its rise and due to the overabundance of 
2011 most of it with Hong Kong. By the end of April, yuan deposits in Hong Kong 
climb to 511 billion yuan ($79 billion), or 8.4% of total deposits. 
April 28, 
2011 
Li Ka-shing's Hui Xian Real Estate Investment Trust becomes the first yuan-
denominated initial public offering outside of China but falls sharply on its 
debut on the Hong Kong exchange. 
September, 
2011 
Guggenheim Investments and Invesco rolled out the yuan denominated bonds 
on the New York Stock Exchange. 
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power in the hegemon, China as the challenger state does not always balance or form an 
alliance.  
 Aside from structural constraints that hinder the challenger from confronting the 
hegemon, the challenger is also impeded by the factors within its borders. The concerns of 
regime security and the lack of cohesion and consensus among the elites also stop states from 
focusing on its foreign endeavors. China is a prime case. Despite having a tight consensus 
and cohesion among the elites, the regime has never felt secure on its feet. A vast territory 
with diverse ethnic populations coupled with the fading saliency of the Communist doctrine, 
Chinese leaders are always under huge pressure to maintain the integrity, territory and the 
solidarity of the state. Therefore, it signed many border treaties providing concessions to the 
aggrieved states even though it was powerful enough to extract more in the settlements. But, 
China preferred the stability of its frontier regions over the lost territories. Even then, the 
Chinese regime can only provide so much concession in the future. Issues like Tibet and 
Taiwan are of paramount interest to the Chinese people and if the regime were to somehow 
lose its grip on these matters, the Chinese people will definitely hold the leaders accountable. 
So, the leaders have to maintain a balance between its domestic and foreign agendas in order 
to safe-guard their rule. 
 This study used only a few variables that are put forth in neoclassical realist literature. 
Because of tight control on the decision making process by a small number of elites, the 
variables such as cohesion and consensus among the elites were not discussed that much. But, 
this might be the next big factor. As Chinese people and the elites interact more with the 
outside world, they are more likely to aspire for democratic values and freedom of expression. 
While Chinese leaders themselves might be aware of the inevitability of the need for 
democratic reforms, they only seem to be taking measured steps at the moment and real 
reforms are nowhere close. How wealthy and educated Chinese citizens are going to react to 
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the continuation of the politically oppressive regime is a question that should interest scholars 
in the future. Also, interested scholars may take a look into how Chinese domestic political 
system is oriented and how it is evolving. As Chinese citizens and groups with varied 
interests get wealthier and more resourceful, are they more likely to unite into opposing 
factions to promote their respective economic interests and values? Will this lead to a 
competitive environment within? These queries are indeed interesting and will surely impact 
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